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Since 2020, Europe has experienced the worst pandemic for a century, the largest war on the continent since 1945 and the biggest energy shock since the 1970s. Far from being a Belle Epoque of peace and prosperity, it has been much more of a time of troubles.

While this misfortune is unrelated to Brexit per se, it frames the context for the upcoming renegotiation of the 2020 EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, alongside Donald Trump’s reelection to the US presidency. The Trade and Cooperation Agreement is the deal agreed at a fast pace between London and Brussels to try to cement a post-Brexit relationship.

In a UK political landscape in which there is next to no possibility of the country rejoining the EU in the 2020s, there is nonetheless appetite from both sides to deepen ties. The agreement was a “hard Brexit” option that saw the UK’s economic ties with the EU significantly reduced, at the instigation of then-Prime Minister Boris Johnson.

Indeed, the UK-EU agreement may have been the first trade negotiation in history where barriers went up, rather than down, and was therefore only a starting solution to the two sides’ future economic collaboration. For instance, the deal is a key obstacle for parts of the services sector, which accounts for a large part of both the UK and EU economies.

Yet, significant as the economic retrenchment is under the 2020 deal, defense and security policy did not even feature at all. At the time, this was a surprise, as a proposed future relationship on this front had been extensively previewed.

Talks before 2020 had pointed to significant future cooperation in this area, including with the UK potentially being invited to participate in EU military initiatives and foreign minister meetings. But the Johnson team shifted position during the negotiations, despite the largely complementary nature of London and Brussels’ positions on many key global issues.

Part of the challenge with the 2020 agreement is that it was struck in just eight months. What has been called a bare-bones agreement was the almost inevitable result.

The longer the Brexit agreement remains unchanged, the more pressing it is for London to reform it

Andrew Hammond

 

Developments since 2020, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, highlight the value of greater UK-EU post-Brexit security and foreign policy cooperation. So, it is likely a deal on this pillar will be done in 2025.

On the economic front, what is becoming clearer five years on from the signing of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement is that it has created structural impediments to trade that are not improving significantly. This has been highlighted by national business groups like the British Chambers of Commerce, not just politicians.

The EU got much of what it wanted from the agreement, including a zero-tariff, zero-quota deal for goods, in which it runs a surplus with the UK. Meanwhile, Brussels gave away little on services, which is a British strength. The longer the agreement remains unchanged, the more pressing it is for London to reform it.

It is in this context that there is growing support in the UK for a closer economic relationship with the EU. For some, like the Liberal Democrats and Scottish National Party, this ultimately means rejoining the bloc. However, with Prime Minister Keir Starmer having ruled out a return to EU membership and the Conservatives now having very few pro-Brussels legislators in their midst following the purges under Johnson’s premiership, it is unlikely the country will return during this political generation, if ever.

So, Labour’s focus is now much more on making Brexit work better for the country, with the center of debate increasingly turning away from “Leave versus Remain.” A key, pragmatic reason for Starmer taking this stance is the political turmoil that engulfed the country for much of the period following the 2016 referendum, with no clear post-Brexit settlement emerging under the Conservatives. If Starmer had sought to rejoin the EU, a hugely disproportionate part of the energies of his government would have needed to be focused on this touchstone issue.

What this means, however, is that the 2025 UK-EU renegotiation is probably not going to be as ambitious as some 2016 Remainers favor. Rather than seeing the next few months as a one-time-only process, it is likely the coming period may see further UK-EU bilateral deals to refashion the partnership, potentially in a similar scenario to recent Swiss-EU relations.

The Swiss example is interesting in its parallels with the UK, given that in 1992 Switzerland voted by 50.3 percent to 49.7 percent against joining the European Economic Area, which is an extension of the EU’s single market to member states of the European Free Trade Association. In the period since, Switzerland has negotiated a series of deals with Brussels.

If the UK experience with the EU proves similar, it will be one of the great ironies of the 2016 referendum. That is, despite the plebiscite that saw about 52 percent of voters apparently voting to cut ties with the EU, London has had to devote huge attention to Europe ever since then.

Almost a decade after the 2016 referendum, the UK’s future relationship with the EU is still far from being completely defined, despite massive efforts to do so. Moreover, views on the relationship the nation wishes to have with the bloc could well change significantly over time, in a more or less integrationist direction, as political and public opinion evolves.

The stakes in play are therefore big, not just for the UK but also the EU. A deeper, more constructive partnership, which is more likely under Starmer’s government, can bring benefits for both sides at a time of significant global geopolitical turbulence.

• Andrew Hammond is an Associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.