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Following the bitter objections of the “Shiite duo” to Nawaf Salam’s designation as Lebanese prime minister, he is seeking to reassure them by stressing that he has two choices: accommodation or … accommodation.

Thus, surrendering to failure is not an option. There is no desire for the vindictiveness or exclusion that Mohammad Raad, the head of Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc, complained of. This position fits with what we know about the prime minister-designate: a calm, cultured figure who is very familiar with the conditions of southern Lebanon. His familiarity stems from his family’s extensive properties in the Tyre district, close to the southern border, and his marriage to a woman from the city of Sidon, the largest city and capital of the South Governorate.

More importantly, Salam did not take on the role of prime minister to settle scores with the “resistance” and there is no reason to think that he did. As a diplomat and judge at the UN, he courageously confronted Israel’s Likudists from within the organization’s two most powerful bodies: the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice. Furthermore, his leadership will strengthen the south’s position in the new political equation, particularly since the president, Gen. Joseph Aoun, is the first southerner to occupy the position since Lebanon gained its independence.

The Lebanese face a new political reality. A key feature of this reality is that Lebanese citizens have reclaimed their agency

Eyad Abu Shakra

The picture should be clear with this introduction. But where might the problems lie?

The early Shiite objections are ominous, especially since they are underpinned by three significant and interrelated accusations rooted in the post-Israel war climate: betrayal of the “resistance” (Hezbollah and its base), seeking to leverage external influence to their disadvantage, and seeking to “marginalize” Shiite influence, beginning with their exclusion from the formation of Salam’s Cabinet.

It is understandable that a deep and inflamed wound has been left by the Israeli assault, cutting into Hezbollah’s body amid unprecedented US support for Israel. Moreover, it was easy for Washington to justify that war to the West, as it could claim that Hezbollah was not defending itself or resisting the occupation of its land this time. Rather, Hezbollah had launched a war of choice — without coordinating with the Lebanese state — in solidarity with Hamas in Gaza.

Of course, despite the horrific massacres and displacement in Gaza, the American-Israeli narrative is that Israel’s belligerence was a “defensive response” to Hamas’ attack on the Gaza envelope during the Al-Aqsa Flood operation on Oct. 7, 2023.

Thus, the political miscalculations — firstly those of Hamas and then those of Hezbollah — did not merely justify Washington’s support for Israel’s war machine, they also left the Republicans and Democrats “outbidding” one another to curry favor with the Israeli lobby in the year before November’s US presidential election. In the end, this auction was won by the Republican right, which is fully aligned behind the Likud, a significant victory.

There is no need to unpack the reasons for Iran’s role in encouraging both the Al-Aqsa Flood and Hezbollah’s subsequent supporting war. The Lebanese people are now clearly confronted with a new political reality. A key feature of this reality is that Lebanese citizens have reclaimed their agency, despite the multitude of interpretations and conflicting interests of small partisan and sectarian groups.

For decades, Hezbollah (with backing from Iran and, to a large extent, the Assad regime) used the pretext of resistance to solidify its grip over the country. Unlike other Lebanese partisan and sectarian militias, Hezbollah retained its arsenal, becoming the only armed nonstate actor in the country, even after Israel’s withdrawal in 2000. Until 2005, however, patriotic Lebanese citizens had seen no compelling reason to provoke a domestic crisis and tensions with a Lebanese faction that, geographically at least, had fought only on the front lines with Israel.

The party’s leaders seem to have forgotten the role of external actors in granting them the upper hand in the past

Eyad Abu Shakra

Although the Lebanese were aware of Hezbollah’s ideological and strategic ties to foreign actors, particularly Iran, they did not seriously question its role and ambitions until the wave of assassinations and assassination attempts that began in 2004. Then came the 2006 war, which was followed by the incursions into Beirut and Mount Lebanon and the occupation of downtown Beirut to impose Michel Aoun as president, making the picture crystal clear.

The party’s leaders, who are accusing the forces responsible for bringing Joseph Aoun and then Salam to the executive of yielding to foreign dictates, seem to have forgotten the role of external actors in granting them the upper hand in the past. Their dominance was reflected in every aspect of Lebanon’s political, security, economic and judicial life. They also ignored the fact that, for the first time, deputies and other political figures acted in line with popular sentiment.

“The street,” sensing the implications of Hezbollah’s recent setback, embraced the party’s community without hesitation or begrudging generosity.

After decades of living under the nightmare of Damascus’ rule, which began in the mid-1970s, the people of Lebanon reached out to Hezbollah despite its negative role in Syria.

The truth, quite simply, is that the Lebanese street opposes exclusion, isolation and marginalization. However, it hopes that Hezbollah will turn the page and introduce a chapter defined by citizenship rather than arrogance, partnership rather than contempt and consensus rather than domination.

• Eyad Abu Shakra is managing editor of Asharq Al-Awsat, where this article was originally published. X: @eyad1949