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The Aoun phenomenon in Lebanon began in the late 1980s with huge popular demonstrations outside the presidential palace in support of Gen. Michel Aoun as prime minister. It probably ended 40 years later with nationwide mass demonstrations in October 2019 against his presidency and the entire ruling establishment.

The question now is whether the mantle of “Aounism” has passed to the new President Joseph Aoun — who is not related, but was also elected from outside the political class.

Several factors help us to understand the phenomenon. The first is historical: among the Maronites, there have always been populist, anti-establishment currents. The most famous were the 19th-century peasant revolts, or Ammiyat, directed against the power of the church, the landlords and the big families. The most famous of those in the late 1850s was led by Tanyus Shahin, a mule driver who was elected Sheikh Shabab, or leader of young men, and set up an independent republic from his home village of Rayfun in the Kesrawan after expelling the sheikhs of the region. This is often invoked when the Lebanese take to the streets, such as in 1989-90 when they demonstrated in support of Michel Aoun.

Aoun was then the former army commander appointed prime minister in a provisional government. The country was split, with one government in the Presidential Palace of Baabda on the Christian side and the other in Syrian controlled areas. Aoun opposed the Taif Agreement, signed in ��������Ƶ in 1989 by members of parliament, who he viewed as the corrupt political establishment. The deal included special relations with Syria, against whom he had launched the War of Liberation. Syrian forces launched an operation against Aoun and invaded his strongholds. He fled to the French Embassy in Beirut and was later granted asylum in France, where he lived in exile for 15 years until his return in 2005 after Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon.

But there were other reasons for Aoun’s status, especially but not exclusively in the Christian areas. His confrontational and uncompromising style meant that he inherited the popularity of Bashir Gemayel, who was assassinated in 1983 a couple of weeks after being elected president: also his army credentials, a man of the people rising through the ranks of an institution that symbolizes patriotism and national unity, the purely Lebanese from the mountain as opposed to the corrupt cosmopolitan city.

Another component of Aounism is opposition to militias, against whom he had launched another war starting with the Lebanese Forces that ruled the Christian canton during the civil war. Militia rule was efficient, they collected taxes and provided security and services, but it was extremely unpopular. Many of its members were rough mountain people from the northern district of Besharri. They were not very palatable and were seen as bullies by the inhabitants of the central districts of the Byblos, the Matn and Kesrawan. These later constituted the Aounist heartland where the Free Patriotic Movement that Aoun founded prevailed in elections. That party division still dominates Maronite politics.

Aounists, even if disillusioned by the Free Patriotic Movement, will never shift their allegiance to its rival — they will merely look for another Aoun.

Nadim Shehadi

When Aoun returned in 2005 he again clashed with the system. He considered himself the liberator, uncorrupted and uncontaminated by collaboration with the Syrian presence. When he felt that he was not recognized as such by the anti-Syrian March 14 coalition, he reconciled with the Assad regime and joined the pro-Syrian March 8 coalition, becoming a de facto ally of Hezbollah and the Amal movement of parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri. In the 2005 elections the Free Patriotic Movement won the majority of Maronite seats, 15 against only six for the Lebanese Forces. It was described as the Aoun Tsunami by Druze leader Walid Jumblatt.

Aoun consolidated his alliance with Hezbollah in a 2006 agreement that was seen by his supporters as a patriotic move: a Maronite-Shiite alliance complementing the National Pact of 1943, which was perceived as a Maronite-Sunni alliance. This still did not get them the parliamentary majority in the 2009 election, but it eventually enabled Aoun to fulfil his 27-year dream when he was elected president in 2016. This was after Hezbollah had threatened MPs, leading to the collapse of Saad Hariri’s government in January 2011 in what amounted to a coup. Parliament was paralyzed and the system held hostage for almost three years of institutional vacuum with no president, no parliament and no government until the opposition agreed to vote for Aoun.

Then it all went wrong: Hezbollah did not stand by the commitments of their agreement with the Free Patriotic Movement, or another agreement in 2012 in which all parties had pledged not to get involved in the war in Syria. Then Hezbollah paralyzed the country again in 2022, and dragged it into a destructive war with Israel in 2024, all to the embarrassment of everyone in Aounistan. The defeat of Hezbollah in that war followed by the collapse of the Syrian regime greatly weakened the Free Patriotic Movement. Aoun’s alliance with Hezbollah brought him the presidency, but also brought the end of Aounism as we know it. The Free Patriotic Movement is split, and losing supporters.

But the components of Aounism are still there and they seem to converge around the personality of Joseph Aoun — another former army chief, another man of the people, another political outsider. His speech at his presidential inauguration this month echoed many of the talking points of the October revolution: he also promised to oppose militias and restore the state’s monopoly on holding weapons.

I once observed that sectarianism was in the eye of the beholder: the sectarian prism is overrated as a tool for understanding Lebanese politics. Communities are in fact divided by “normal” politics. The division between the Free Patriotic Movement and the Lebanese Forces is not a zero-sum game: Aounists, even if disillusioned by the Free Patriotic Movement, will never shift their allegiance to its rival — they will merely look for another Aoun.

• Nadim Shehadi is an economist and political adviser. X: @Confusezeus