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Superficially, 2024 has not differed greatly from 2023 when it comes to global power dynamics. Many of the key features were already with us, whether the growth of populism in the West, the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine or the rise of middle powers. Yet, even if these trends are not new, the past year has seen them continue to build a momentum that points to a gradual shift toward a multipolar world order and a weakening of the West. The year’s most dramatic development, the election of Donald Trump, looks likely to accelerate this. For, while the new White House could make the US a fiercer international player, it could also weaken the West as a whole.
The wars in Ukraine, Gaza, and Lebanon have been damaging for Western states over 2024. In Ukraine, Russia has made slow but steady progress. Despite Kyiv’s audacious Kursk offensive in August and an increased willingness to launch attacks inside Russian territory, the war has gone badly. While the year began with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky still insisting all occupied territory could be recovered, it has ended with a seeming acceptance by his Western allies that a negotiated peace is inevitable. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s call with Vladimir Putin in November was symptomatic of this gradual softening.
Israel’s wars in Gaza and Lebanon have presented different challenges. Unlike in Ukraine, where the West’s ally is struggling, Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has had a successful year militarily. Hamas has been crushed, with Oct. 7 mastermind Yahya Sinwar killed, while Hezbollah has been decimated, with most of its leadership, including Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, assassinated. Some commentators even argue Israel might be able to use these military successes to reorder the Middle East.
However, the scale of the destruction in Gaza and Lebanon, with more than 45,000 Palestinians and almost 4,000 Lebanese killed, has battered Israel’s international reputation. Unlike with Ukraine, initial Western unity behind Israel has fractured. In May, Norway, Ireland, and Spain officially recognized the state of Palestine in protest at the Gaza war, while France and the UK have sanctioned settlers, with London even symbolically suspending a handful of arms licenses.
The UK, France, Ireland, and Italy have also all indicated they would arrest Netanyahu should he visit following the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court. This is in sharp contrast to the US which, despite some criticism, rejects the court and has steadfastly backed Israel. Trump looks set to expand on this, potentially opening up further rifts with Europe.
Israel’s wars have also damaged the reputation of Western states in the Global South, as they have continued to arm and support Israel and done too little to rein in Netanyahu. Though Israel ignored the International Court of Justice’s ruling in July that its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza is unlawful, the case, brought by South Africa, pointed to a shift in the global order.
Non-Western states are increasingly willing to use Western-established institutions like the International Court of Justice to highlight what they perceive as Western hypocrisy. Geopolitically, both China and Russia have made much of this in the past year, arguing that they are more reliable partners to the Global South than the hypocritical West. While a ceasefire in Lebanon appears to be holding, the longer the Gaza war continues, the more damage it could do to the integrity of the Western alliance and its global reputation. 

Trump might make the US ostensibly more powerful and, in contrast to the Biden years, a more central actor in world affairs.

Christopher Phillips

The Western alliance risks further weakness from the continued popularity of right-wing populism at home. The year 2024 has seen populists triumph in the Austrian elections, enter government in the Netherlands, and come close to power in France. The growth of popular nationalism undermines the principle of collective security and points to a more transactional approach to intra-Western relations.
The Ukraine war is a case in point. Initially, Western states were united behind Kyiv, but increased criticism has been led by populists. Hungary’s Viktor Orban is the most vocal, but the Netherlands’ populist Party for Freedom has also questioned aid to Ukraine. Meanwhile, Alternative for Germany, which won a state-level election for the first time in 2024 and looks set to do well in the upcoming national elections, has also historically been pro-Russia and critical of Kyiv.
Until now, European unity against Russia has largely held despite the election of populists, either because they have proven less isolationist in power, as with Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, or because they govern smaller states like Hungary. But should Alternative for Germany enter power in 2025, this could seriously impact Europe’s Russia policy.
Already, Europe faces a tricky 2025 due to the incoming Trump administration. If Trump presses ahead with tariffs on allies, it will both damage European economies and further strain US-EU relations, both of which will weaken the Western alliance. Moreover, if Trump insists, as expected, on reducing America’s NATO commitments and on Europeans paying higher defense costs, this will further challenge EU economies. It could also make them more insular, focused on defending Europe rather than projecting power further afield. The net result would be a weaker Western alliance globally.
Beyond Europe, 2024 has been a mixed year for America’s geostrategic rivals. Russia has recovered from some of the isolation it experienced in 2022-23 by embracing non-Western powers, ensuring its isolation is limited to the West rather than being global. Hosting the expanded BRICS conference in October underlined this, with the leaders of China, Turkiye and Egypt, among others, traveling to Kazan to meet Putin.
The expansion of BRICS, which formally welcomed the UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia and Iran in 2024, also boosts China, which is keen for the bloc to rival Western-dominated international institutions. But Beijing is somewhat less confident as the year ends, as it faces the twin problems of sluggish growth in its economy and the return of Trump, who has appointed several China hawks to his Cabinet and appears to be gearing up for a trade war.
Herein could lie the paradox of Trump’s return for geopolitics. His combative approach, particularly his willingness to use trade as a weapon, understandably concerns both his European allies and his Chinese rivals — even if another foe, Russia, may be hoping he will broker a favorable deal for Moscow in Ukraine. This might make the US ostensibly more powerful and, in contrast to the Biden years, a more central actor in world affairs. But Trump’s transnationalism and a seeming lack of commitment to the Western alliance could leave the West as a whole weaker on the world stage, with it already suffering as a result of geopolitical shifts and the rise of isolationist populism at home.
Moreover, the US today lacks the power to push global actors into an anti-Chinese trading position in the way it might have done during either the Cold War or the post-Cold War era of US dominance. Washington may damage China’s economy, but this is unlikely to seriously limit Beijing’s influence in the Global South and non-Western world. Likewise, other powerful economies like India, South Africa and Brazil, while conscious of not provoking Trump, will not likely bend excessively around him in a way they might have during the 1990s and 2000s.
Trump’s return will therefore likely represent a shift in style rather than a fundamental change in global geopolitics. This year continued the trend toward a weakening West within a multipolar world and 2025, with Trump in the White House, looks set for that to largely continue.

• Christopher Phillips is professor of international relations at Queen Mary University of London and author of “Battleground: Ten Conflicts that Explain the New Middle East.”
X: @cjophillips