��������Ƶ

As Europe gets used to the fact that President Donald Trump is returning to the White House, many are wondering what this means for the war in Ukraine and the future of NATO. Almost three years into the conflict, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine remains the most consequential moment in transatlantic security since the Second World War.
This has been a critical year for the war. In 2024, Russia made minor gains in Ukraine but at a high cost and made a record increase in airstrikes on Ukrainian cities. Meanwhile, Ukraine undertook a bold invasion of Russia’s Kursk Oblast and started developing weapons that can hit targets hundreds of kilometers deep inside Russia. Finally, this was the year that North Korean ground troops entered the conflict on the side of Russia. In sum, it has been an eventful year in the conflict.
After Ukraine’s lackluster performance during its 2023 counteroffensive, few of its supporters held high hopes for a major operation this year. Instead, the focus of Ukraine’s Western allies shifted to rearming, refitting and training the Ukrainian armed forces in preparation for further counteroffensive operations in 2025. This effort was complicated by political delays in the US Congress, which postponed crucial aid for months. By early 2024, the consequences of this delay were severe. When US aid finally passed in March, Ukraine was running low on air defense missiles, artillery shells and even basic ammunition for front-line soldiers.
During a summer marked by small but tactically significant Russian gains, especially in the Donetsk region, Ukraine took advantage of newly arrived American assistance and launched an audacious invasion of Russia’s Kursk Oblast. This operation was arguably the most surprising and consequential event of the war in 2024. It demonstrated that Ukraine could succeed on the battlefield when supplied with the necessary resources.
The capture of Russian territory by Ukraine all but guarantees that the front lines cannot be “frozen” where they currently are in any future peace talks. Furthermore, Ukraine’s incursion into Russian territory forced Moscow to divert resources and troops to defend Kursk, reducing the pressure on other parts of the front.
In 2024, the war in Ukraine also became directly linked to East Asian security. Open-source intelligence had already confirmed that North Korea had supplied Russia with more than a million artillery shells and ballistic missiles. However, in the fall, Pyongyang escalated its involvement by sending about 10,000 troops to support Russia. This development, in turn, sparked renewed cooperation between Ukraine and South Korea, North Korea’s long-time adversary.
Meanwhile, Russia has intensified airstrikes on Ukrainian cities at a level not seen since the war began in 2022. Each month, thousands of drones and missiles are launched at Ukrainian targets, many hitting civilian infrastructure. These attacks have severely tested Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, but Kyiv has so far mitigated the worst effects, thanks to ongoing Western support.
Diplomatically, Ukraine faced disappointment at the NATO summit in Washington in July, which marked the alliance’s 75th anniversary. Many hoped for a clear path to NATO membership, understanding that immediate accession was unrealistic while Kyiv remained at war with Russia. However, Ukraine received only vague promises of eventual membership without a concrete roadmap. This was a missed opportunity for NATO and Ukraine, turning what could have been a historic milestone into a mere celebration of its past.

While Trump may pursue a resolution to the conflict, expecting a swift or straightforward outcome would be unrealistic. 

Luke Coffey

The outcome of the US presidential election in November could also drastically shape the war’s trajectory. Although the conflict did not dominate the campaign, it surfaced occasionally, with Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris offering differing perspectives. Trump repeatedly claimed he could end the war quickly and asserted that the invasion would not have occurred under his leadership. Harris, on the other hand, echoed the current administration’s commitment to supporting Ukraine without offering specifics on how her approach might differ from President Joe Biden’s, particularly regarding increased aid or lifting restrictions on US weapons.
With Trump returning to the White House in January, speculation is rife about his plans for Ukraine and NATO. There is widespread debate over what Trump will or will not do regarding the conflict. While he appears sincere in wanting to end the war, his exact strategy remains unclear.
To anticipate Trump’s approach, one can look at his handling of key foreign policy issues during his first term, notably his withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal with Iran. Despite pledging to withdraw from the Iran deal during his 2016 campaign, Trump did not take immediate action upon assuming office in 2017. Instead, an interagency review led to a phased withdrawal, culminating in May 2018. This was about one-third of the way through his first term. In its place, Trump introduced a “maximum pressure” campaign. Regardless of one’s opinion on this decision, it was not executed hastily or without a plan.
A similarly methodical approach is likely for Ukraine. Although some of Trump’s past remarks have been perceived as sympathetic to Russia, there is room for cautious optimism. Trump will want to avoid appearing weak or defeated. A settlement viewed as a Russian victory would be politically damaging for him. In terms of America’s image in the world, an outcome to the war in Ukraine that makes Russia stronger while leaving Ukraine weak would be on par with the outgoing administration’s disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan.
While Ukrainians are very grateful for the aid that Biden has provided since February of 2022, there is growing frustration among many about the slow pace of the assistance in recent months and the tight restrictions placed on the use of American weapons by the White House. Since Harris never expressed that she would do things differently from Biden, Trump’s election victory is viewed by many in Ukraine as a potential positive.
Additionally, Trump’s recent interactions with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky have been described as constructive. The two had a good meeting in person back in September. Within 24 hours of Trump’s reelection, the two leaders spoke again on the phone, signaling continued dialogue. Furthermore, key appointments in Trump’s new administration bode well for Ukraine. National Security Adviser Mike Waltz and Secretary of State nominee Marco Rubio have both expressed support for Ukraine in the past.
While Trump may pursue a resolution to the conflict, expecting a swift or straightforward outcome would be unrealistic. The world should not be surprised or disappointed when the war does not find a satisfactory conclusion in 2025.
Next year’s NATO summit in the Netherlands will be another critical juncture. Trump’s well-known criticism of the defense spending of America’s NATO allies could resurface, but the alliance he returns to in 2025 is significantly different from the one he encountered in 2017. At that time, only a handful of member nations met the 2 percent of gross domestic product defense spending target. Now, 23 out of 32 members meet or exceed this benchmark, with more expected to follow.
Additionally, European countries have collectively increased their financial support for Ukraine, often surpassing the amount of aid provided by the US. While Trump may continue to press Europe to do more, he can take credit for pushing NATO toward greater military investment during his first term.
As 2024 comes to a close, the war in Ukraine remains at a pivotal crossroads. Despite numerous setbacks, Ukraine’s resilience and ongoing Western support have prevented Russia from achieving its broader objectives. However, the future remains uncertain. The coming year will test the diplomatic, military and political resolve of all parties involved, with global security hanging in the balance.
Trump should use his second term to build out his foreign policy legacy. At the top of the agenda could be a fair and just conclusion to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and an increase in military spending on the enhancement of the NATO alliance in Europe. Achieving this would go a long way to making America strong again.

• Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. X: @LukeDCoffey