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The sight of Israeli ground troops crossing into Lebanon, and not for the first time, reminded me of what the Spanish-American philosopher George Santayana said more than a century ago: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” It always baffles me why leaders do not learn from history, even the recent history that many of them have lived through.
Admittedly, Israel and Lebanon do not have a natural border, such as a river or a mountain range, but rather a political one, the Blue Line — a demarcation established by the UN as a temporary border that the UN Interim Force in Lebanon peacekeeping operation could monitor after Israel finally withdrew from its northern neighbor in 2000. This border is more or less consistent with the Anglo-French accord of 1923, which provides a partial explanation for the volatility of this border.
As a matter of fact, previous Israeli military and political attempts to establish the Litani River as a security border all ended in disaster. It took 18 years for the Israeli army to get out of the quagmire following its invasion of 1982, while in the process inflicting enormous damage on Lebanon and its people and contributing to the country’s instability. Israel also suffered many casualties during years of holding to a buffer zone before it eventually withdrew to the international border, leaving the situation even more fragile and unstable.
Israel’s objective of ensuring the security of its northern border in order to allow 60,000 displaced citizens to return safely to their homes after being forced out by Hezbollah’s constant onslaught of rockets, missiles, and drones since last October is justifiable. But the way it is pursuing it is increasingly worrying, as it is beginning to resemble the way it is dealing with Gaza.
There is no fundamental border dispute between the states of Israel and Lebanon and their two armies have not confronted each other on the battlefield since 1948. The disagreement over the 28 sq. km of the Shebaa farms, most of which is generally agreed to belong to Syria and not Lebanon, and which is now occupied by Israel, is at best an excuse for Hezbollah to maintain its raison d’etre in Lebanese politics and society.
At the end of the day, what justification is there for Hezbollah to continue as a well-armed militia that is capable of overshadowing the Lebanese army and that serves Tehran’s interests more than those of the Lebanese people? It was also unconvincing in its declared support for the Palestinian cause before Oct. 7 of last year, as well as in its subsequent half-hearted military attempt to force Israel to change its war tactics in Gaza. Nevertheless, it has done enough for Israel to eventually turn its attention to its northern border and to what might develop into an excessive use of force to match that of its onslaught in Gaza.
The Hamas attack last year shuffled the strategic cards for Israel. Until then, it had regarded the threat from Hezbollah as a greater concern in terms of its capabilities and intentions, as well as because of the Iran nexus.

Israel may be about to enter into a prolonged war unless the international community intervenes, and does so quickly. 

Yossi Mekelberg

For years, Israel’s security forces have spent much of their energy and resources attempting to slow down the transfer of weapons and ammunition from Iran into the hands of Hezbollah out of concern for what it is currently facing: rockets, missiles, and drones targeting military bases and civilians deep inside the country.
Yet, despite the recent and persistent bombardment by the Israeli military of this Lebanese movement’s arms storage facilities, the elimination of most of its senior leadership, including Hassan Nasrallah, and the launch of a ground campaign inside Lebanon, Hezbollah is still capable of firing rockets and launching drones into Israel.
While there was international recognition among Israel’s friends and allies that it had the right to respond to what Hamas and Hezbollah have inflicted on its citizens and to ensure that Israelis could return safely to their homes close to the border, this was not and should never have been a license to sow death and devastation on a vast scale, let alone with no obvious strategic endgame.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his far-right coalition are setting themselves up to fail because their war objectives are maximalist, relying on military force without a political horizon that could be facilitated by diplomacy. Since the widespread explosions of Hezbollah operatives’ booby-trapped pagers and walkie-talkies last month, events have unfolded rapidly and equally dangerously.
It initially seemed that Israel was intending to compel Nasrallah to agree to return to the 2006 UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which was aimed at creating security arrangements that would prevent the resumption of hostilities along the Israel-Lebanon border. However, with Nasrallah’s assassination, it appears that Tel Aviv is attempting to enforce at least one aspect of UNSC Resolution 1559 of 2004: that of the dismantling of militias in Lebanon — in this case, of Hezbollah in its entirety.
If this is the case, it means that Israel is about to enter into a prolonged war unless the international community intervenes — and does so quickly — especially since the threat of an Iranian-Israeli escalation looms large.
Every generation thinks that it can do better than the last, but military incursions that are not surgical and clinical, not limited in time and have no clear political objective are bound to go wrong — badly wrong.
It is incontrovertible that Hezbollah has suffered massive losses over the last few weeks, but it is not defeated and is signaling that it is ready for a deal if one is achieved with Hamas in Gaza. This might be the opportunity to end the war, see the release of the hostages, and pave the way to ending the humanitarian disaster. And, with it, regional de-escalation followed by a plan to restart the reconstruction of Gaza and an Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
At this point, such a sequence of events sounds unrealistic, mainly because there are no leaderships capable of compromise or who have the vision, imagination, and courage to change direction. The Netanyahu government — because it has turned the military tide in its favor, despite being far from defeating Hamas and even further away from crushing Hezbollah — now has the opportunity to accelerate negotiations for a deal in Gaza, which would make one in Lebanon easier. It must translate its current advantageous military position into a tangible and lasting political settlement, and do so before its amnesia sends the Israeli army into an endless downward spiral in both Gaza and Lebanon.

• Yossi Mekelberg is a professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House. X: @YMekelberg