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Of all the 27 EU nations, it is the bloc’s most powerful state and largest economy, Germany, that may have the most at stake in November’s US election. This was clear on Thursday and Friday, when Joe Biden made what is likely to be his last presidential trip to Europe.
Biden’s relationship with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has been far from disagreement-free over the last few years. Nonetheless, the relationship between the two men has been significantly more constructive than the one between their respective predecessors, Angela Merkel and Donald Trump.
That the four-year period of overlap between Trump and Merkel from early 2017 to early 2021 saw the biggest flux in bilateral ties in decades is unquestionable. There were not only major policy challenges, but also very poor personal relations between the two leaders.
To be sure, there have been previous significant disagreements between Germany and the US in the postwar era. One example was the 2003 Iraq War, which created a significant schism in the transatlantic alliance, as then-Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder opposed US President George W. Bush’s decision to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime.
However, Germany has generally had strong ties with the US since 1945. Indeed, for much of her long chancellorship from 2005 to 2021, Merkel was seen by numerous American presidents, especially Barack Obama, as the go-to European leader during times of trouble.
Merkel and many other politicians in Berlin, including Scholz, who served in her final government as finance minister, were thankful to see the back of Trump in 2021. Biden, a long-standing Atlanticist, was expected to bring back much of the stability of traditional postwar bilateral ties with Germany — and this has largely proven to be the case.
A centerpiece of Biden’s restoration of relations with Germany has been over Ukraine, on which, by and large, there has been alignment with Scholz following Russia’s invasion in 2022. During his trip, the US president played to this theme by hosting a meeting with Scholz, French President Emmanuel Macron, and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer.

The US president sees Germany as an increasingly important anchor point in the transatlantic relationship.

Andrew Hammond

Beyond the key issue of Ukraine, Biden and Scholz have also found significant common ground in wider areas. These include close cooperation on a range of challenges, including ending the COVID-19 pandemic, addressing the threat of climate change, and promoting economic prosperity.
The diplomatic mood music between Berlin and Washington has also improved since the end of a 17-year transatlantic aerospace trade war over alleged government support for Airbus and Boeing. Both sides announced in 2021 that they would suspend retaliatory tariffs on billions of dollars in non-aviation goods and ensure that future research and development funding would not favor each other’s aviation industries.
Moreover, Biden has also dialed down US rhetoric on several long-standing irritants in the bilateral relationship, especially trade and defense spending, which Trump regularly emphasized. On trade, for instance, Trump repeatedly called Germany “very bad” because of its significant trade surplus, while he castigated Germany’s failure to spend 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense, a key NATO goal.
These remain important for Biden too. Yet, they are ultimately subservient to his broader strategic goal of reconsolidating the Western alliance in the face of growing security challenges, including from Russia.
So, Biden has done all he can to stabilize the bilateral relationship with Berlin. For, in the post-Brexit era, the US president sees Germany as an increasingly important anchor point in the transatlantic relationship, especially at this time of increasing geopolitical flux.
Yet, for all that Biden’s trip lifted spirits in Berlin, there is much concern about the pending US election. Scholz and most other mainstream politicians in Germany would strongly favor a win for Biden’s Vice President Kamala Harris. This is not necessarily because of wild enthusiasm for Harris, but out of concern for the consequences for Berlin of a second Trump administration.
During Trump’s presidency, bilateral relations sometimes appeared to go into freefall, including the possibility of a trade war. A range of bilateral irritants plagued relations, from foreign policy issues such as the Iran nuclear deal through to Trump’s trade sanctions on steel and aluminum imports.
The personal factor was also important, with Merkel’s style and values colliding with those of Trump, who relished his role as a disruptor of the established Western order that she embodied. This was symbolized in March 2017, when Merkel first met Trump, as he appeared to refuse to shake her hand at a press conference.
In the case of a second Trump presidency, these tensions would likely resurface, possibly even in an intensified form in some cases. Potential flashpoints include China policy, which would probably be a key focal point for Trump. He would likely be critical of the continuing strong business ties between Beijing and Berlin.
So, for all the warm words exchanged between Biden and Scholz, November’s election is keeping Berlin on edge. While few EU states would welcome a second Trump presidency, it may be Germany that has the most to lose.

• Andrew Hammond is an Associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.