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There is no doubt that Israel’s assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah is nothing less than a seismic affair. The current escalation in hostilities between Israel and the Iranian-backed movement has felt inevitable for months, regardless of the fact that, between the state of Lebanon and Israel, there have been no major border disputes.

However, on this occasion, the venomous exchanges of rhetoric have led to red lines being crossed. Over the last fortnight, events have been unfolding at such a dangerously breathtaking pace that there are now Israeli army troops on the ground in southern Lebanon and the war is threatening to spiral into a full-scale direct confrontation between Israel and Iran.

That Israel would shift its focus from its front with Hamas in Gaza was hardly unexpected. The situation in Gaza has entered a new, although equally concerning, phase in which a lower intensity war continues. Hamas’ capabilities have been considerably reduced and it is mainly conducting a guerilla war against the Israeli army. The latter, meanwhile, continues its military operations, which are still exacting a heavy price from the civilian population, where humanitarian aid hardly reaches those who need it most and international attention and efforts to reach a ceasefire are fading.

This has allowed Israel to shift its focus to what concerned it long before Oct. 7 last year — the danger emanating from Hezbollah’s military buildup on its northern border and, since the Gaza war began, its constant targeting of Israeli communities in the north of the country.

Israel is using its full force to totally cripple both Hezbollah’s leadership and its military capabilities

Yossi Mekelberg

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar had high hopes that Iran, and especially Hezbollah, would open up new fronts with Israel to ease the pressure on him, as he expected a massive response from Israel in the aftermath of the notorious Oct. 7 attack. However, Iran preferred to stay on the sidelines without direct involvement, while facilitating Hezbollah to do the job for it and while Nasrallah took a position that now seems to have led to the worst of all worlds for his movement and ultimately for himself personally.

Nasrallah opted not to use maximum force against Israel when it was probably at its most vulnerable, forcing it to fully engage its forces on two fronts. But he did enough to displace most of the population from the north of Israel and make it strategically impossible for Tel Aviv to restore normality there. The view was that, as long as more than 60,000 of its citizens remained displaced, Israel was handing Hezbollah — and, by extension, Iran — a significant strategic victory that it could not afford.

What started with thousands of exploding pagers and walkie-talkies continued with something that has gone beyond forcing Hezbollah to cease targeting Israeli towns and villages. It has led to Israel using its full force to totally cripple both the organization’s leadership and its military capabilities.

Within the Israeli Cabinet, there has always been a school of thought, from the minute that Hezbollah joined the war and even after Nasrallah stated that Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack on Israel was a “100 percent Palestinian” affair, that the army’s principal concern should shift to the northern front because the main strategic threat to Israel comes from Hezbollah and its patron in Tehran. Among the proponents of this approach were Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and senior military commanders.

As time went by, some sort of a stalemate took over the confrontation between the two sworn enemies. Although Israel inflicted more casualties and hit more military targets over the last year than Hezbollah, the situation was less comfortable for Tel Aviv due in part to the domestic political pressure to break that impasse and allow the displaced to return to their homes.

Until the targeted killing of Nasrallah, there was a sense that Israel’s interruption of communications, its elimination of much of Hezbollah’s leadership, its hits on the organization’s stocks of weaponry and ammunition and even the limited ground invasion were all intended to force the group’s leadership to reach a political arrangement along the lines of UN Security Resolution 1701 of 2006. This would have ensured that both sides respected the Blue Line and that, between the Blue Line and the Litani river, there would only be the presence of the Lebanese army and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon.

However, as much as this might still be the Israeli endgame, it is clearly hell-bent on firstly inflicting on its enemy to the north maximum damage, such that it will be unable to pose a threat for the foreseeable future. Israel has also given up on the idea of Nasrallah or his organization as a negotiating partner — hence the targeting of his prospective successor Hashem Safieddine.

Who does it envisage will ultimately be its partners in agreeing the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1701?

Yossi Mekelberg

The objective now is to irreversibly weaken Hezbollah’s military and political power, although doing that while harming so many civilians will not help to alter relations with Lebanon and its people, even if Israel were to achieve that objective. The Israeli army is still operating according to the so-called Dahieh doctrine, which was formed back in 2006 as a general approach to dealing with non-state actors. According to the person behind it, former army chief of general staff Gadi Eizenkot, this strategy sees Israel deliberately wield disproportionate power against people and places that are perceived to pose a threat, inflicting on them immense damage and destruction. In the current war in Lebanon, this doctrine is being executed not only against Beirut’s southern suburb of Dahieh, but also the villages and towns bordering Israel and other Hezbollah strongholds.

Tel Aviv’s demand that Hezbollah cease firing missiles into Israel and allow the residents of the north to return home is completely legitimate. But becoming embroiled in a prolonged war in Lebanon while inflicting huge damage on the country and its civilians might turn it into a second Gaza, with Israel stretching itself in a multifront war with dwindling international support.

For now, Israel is conducting what is largely a demonstration of its military prowess in its war with Hezbollah. But since it is hardly conceivable that Israel could completely defeat the group, who does it envisage will ultimately be its partners in agreeing the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1701 or a new, similar resolution? Or perhaps this is not the ultimate aim. Perhaps Israel’s eye is on the bigger prize of Iran, which, by finding itself compelled to launch missiles at Israel in order restore some of its credibility, has inched closer to direct war with Tel Aviv and possibly its allies.

This might have been the aim all along, with former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett describing it as an opportunity to reshape the Middle East. What he does not take into consideration is that this regional reshaping might not end in exactly the way he would like. And if the plan is to involve the US and maybe other Western forces, there is no guarantee this would be the case. The next few days and weeks may prove whether Israel is able to match its strategic objectives with its military capabilities, or whether it has overestimated or even miscalculated.

• Yossi Mekelberg is a professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House. X: @YMekelberg