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Those few hours last Sunday when the start of ceasefire between Israel and Hamas was delayed were nerve-wracking. Would something go wrong again, and the firing resume as people caught a glimpse of light at the end of a long and very dark tunnel? When the truce eventually began after a two-and-a-half-hour delay that felt like two-and-a-half days, there was great relief, but this was coupled with the realization that bringing this horrific 15-month war to a complete end is going to be neither easy nor straightforward.
The understandable total distrust between the two sides is a major factor that will hinder any attempts to progress from this point, or even to adhere to the terms of the first phase of the ceasefire. Both sides are operating on the supposition that despite this agreement, each is still committed to annihilate the other. Moreover, this truce is not the result of an organic process within both leaderships that concluded that they had nothing to gain from continuing the war, but was more the case of a ceasefire externally encouraged — more accurately imposed — by the main mediators. Consequently, there is a genuine fear of insufficient commitment on the part of the warring sides to go through the entire process of ending the war. Instead, we can expect both sides to test each other’s intentions, resolve, and patience every step of the way.
While the terms of the deal were hammered out with the help of the Qatari, Egyptian, and US mediators during the Biden administration, it was Donald Trump’s arrival on the scene that made the difference. After all, a similar agreement was already on the table in December 2023, according to some, but as outgoing US Secretary of State Antony Blinken admitted, Biden was not prepared to use his country’s levers of power to persuade Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu to accept it. Trump, on the other hand, badly wanted it done and dusted before he entered the White House, and leaned on Netanyahu to get a result. What is frustrating and heart-wrenching is to imagine how many lives could have been saved, and how much suffering could have been spared had Washington taken this approach back then.
In this complex conflict, the role the US played, together with the regional mediators, is a crucial lesson on who was able to make a difference by at least bringing about a truce, and they will have to do more to maintain the momentum. While there are doubts about each side’s commitment to this agreement, the mediators, like the rest of the international community, should remain highly vigilant and ensure that the conditions of the three-phase deal are followed to the letter. Adding to the complexity of this entire process is the discrepancy between what the public in Israel and Palestine wish to see happen and what best serves their leaderships’ survival.
Recent history has shown that Netanyahu’s hold on power depends on maintaining and manipulating constant division and malaise within Israeli society, and keeping at least one conflict alive, albeit on the back burner. And, while in Israel’s domestic politics there is never a shortage of contentious issues, after ceasefires were agreed with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, suddenly there was a flare-up in the West Bank, settlers that were administratively detained were released, and settler terrorism has intensified. As much as one opposes administrative detentions because they deprive people of their liberty without due legal process, the timing of this decision suggests that it was meant to appease the far-right messianic settler movement and subdue their opposition to the ceasefire deal.
We can expect both sides to test each other’s resolve and patience.
Yossi Mekelberg
The stuttering start of the first phase, and the rather scarce details about what has been agreed on regarding the second phase, let alone the third phase, is creating room for those who want to derail further progress toward ending this war and who oppose the reconstruction of Gaza. Yet, the agreement leaves some hope for establishing a momentum. The first phase has now been achieved with minimum hiccups, a pause in the fighting, the release of the first group of Israeli hostages and of Palestinian prisoners, the entry into Gaza of hundreds of lorries carrying humanitarian aid, and the slow return of displaced Palestinians to their homes. Such hopeful signs should not lead to the expectation that negotiations on the second phase, which are set to start on the 16th day of the ceasefire, and which will aim to agree on ending the war and returning of the rest of the hostages, are guaranteed to proceed, let alone bound to have a positive conclusion.
The fragility of this agreement derives also from the weakness of both political systems involved. In response to Netanyahu’s signing the deal, the Otzma Yehudit party, which called it a “reckless deal” and a “surrender to terrorism,” quit the coalition with much fanfare and thereby left the government with a majority of just two in the Knesset. Its sister party, Zionist Religious, decided to vote in favor of the deal, but only after bemoaning how dangerous it is, and stayed in government, but it is still threatening to jump ship should the second phase of negotiations entail an end to the war.
As a result, the entire three-phase agreement has been left hanging by a thread. Can Netanyahu afford to lose his majority in the Knesset, which might lead to a general election he is unlikely to win? He would not like that in the middle of his corruption trial. To see out at least the first two phases of the deal, he can rely on the support of most opposition parties, but not necessarily for the full term of this Knesset which expires at the end of 2026. It is highly unlikely that Netanyahu could ever recover his low standing in the polls by claiming victory in Gaza when Hamas, despite the heavy losses it has sustained, still seems to govern the enclave, and it is even less likely that he will be given credit for the return of the hostages, whose ordeal he not only failed to prevent in the first place, but then for so many months blocked a ceasefire that would have seen their release.
This leaves the possibility for Netanyahu to look for the first opportunity to resume the war in Gaza, and by that bring Itamar Ben-Gvir, the former national security minister, back into government — a genuine option. For Trump, this will be an early test for his second administration and its commitment to end wars, leaving Netanyahu to face once again the choice between the stability of his coalition or falling out with Israel’s first and foremost international backer.
• Yossi Mekelberg is a professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House.
X: @YMekelberg