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The sudden fall of Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria last month has inevitably prompted speculation about the impact on the wider Middle East. Many have, understandably, concluded that this is a major loss for Iran.

Chatham House’s Lina Khatib, for example, writing in Foreign Policy, suggested Assad’s fall marks the “end of the Iran-dominated regional order,” ushering in a new one dominated by Israel. Hassan Hassan, editor of New Lines Magazine, similarly wrote that Iran’s demise in Syria will instead prompt a dominance by Turkiye. Yet while both Israel and Turkiye clearly benefit from Assad’s fall, and Iran evidently loses, whether any is set to dominate the region remains unclear.

The Middle East has historically been a difficult region for any state to “dominate.” Since the collapse of the last genuine hegemon, the Ottoman Empire, various regional and external governments have tried, but largely failed, to lead. The state system constructed by Britain and France after the Ottomans saw key power assets like population and natural resources distributed over several so-called middle powers, making the region naturally multipolar.

Unlike North and South America, East Asia or the Indian subcontinent, where one or two countries tower over the others, it is hard for any one state to dominate. Some have tried, such as Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser and Iraq under Saddam Hussein, but they did not succeed. The US similarly made a bid for hegemony after 9/11 but has subsequently retrenched. In its wake, the Middle East’s natural multipolarity has resurfaced, with the region’s middle powers seeking to enhance their position.

Unlike North and South America, East Asia or the Indian subcontinent, it is hard for any one state to dominate

Christopher Phillips

Iran has been the most prominent of these. As the US has gradually stepped back from the regional police officer role it sought in the 1990s and 2000s, Tehran has taken advantage of the vacuum to build and strengthen its network of clients and allies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Palestine, among others. However, though Iran would become the dominant actor in some, if not all, of these states, its influence beyond them was limited.

It would be a stretch to describe Iran’s enhanced position in the 2010s as regional dominance. The region’s other middle powers, whether ��������Ƶ, Qatar, the UAE, Turkiye or Israel, repeatedly pushed back against Tehran in theaters like Syria and Yemen. The same was true of the US, which, though no longer seeking dominance itself, remained the most powerful regional actor, restraining Iran through sanctions or direct military actions like the killing of Qassem Soleimani.

If anything, Iran overachieved in these years. Whatever the scale of its regional ambitions, Tehran has limited capacity, being a medium-sized state with a population of just under 90 million and an unremarkable (sanctioned) economy. Though it has excelled in certain military areas, notably drone warfare and the effective use of nonstate actors, in others, such as its air force and conventional army, it is far behind its regional competitors.

Iran’s leaders will be frustrated at the loss of Syria and, before then, Israel’s decimation of Hezbollah and Hamas in Lebanon and Gaza, respectively, but this reduction in Iran’s sphere of influence is a correction, or “right-sizing,” to more accurately reflect its capacity to project power. Indeed, the fact Tehran could not save Assad this time and was unable to support allies on multiple fronts at once neatly illustrates this.

Israel has in some ways been the opposite: limiting its regional ambitions despite having the capacity to do more. Despite its small population, it has a highly sophisticated military, advanced economy and, of course, a deep alliance with the US, giving it the ability to play a more prominent regional role. But Israel’s focus has instead been on national security, which has historically meant the brutal containment of Palestinian militants and those along neighboring borders. Yet its activism since the Gaza war, including regular strikes against the Houthis in Yemen, suggest a new willingness to shape the region, prompting Khatib’s claim that Israel will dominate.

Turkiye, with the second-largest military in NATO and a prosperous economy, could potentially do more

Christopher Phillips

Turkiye was also historically reluctant to make full use of its capacity. Until the so-called Arab Spring, it was relatively withdrawn from the region the Ottomans once ruled. Since 2011, however, Ankara has been more activist, backing Syria’s rebels against Assad, then occupying several pockets in the north, as well as intervening in Iraq against Kurdish militants and sending troops to Libya and Azerbaijan.

However, these interventions remain relatively modest and Turkiye, with the second-largest military in NATO and a prosperous economy, despite recent struggles, could potentially do more. Analysts like Hassan recognize that its friendly relations with the new regime in Damascus, combined with this extra capacity, offers Turkiye the chance to further its regional power projection.

However, while Israel and Turkiye are clearly in a stronger regional position at Iran’s expense, do not expect either to dominate. As Iran’s leaders have discovered, like Saddam and Nasser before them, the Middle East is not structured to make it easy for one state to lead. Even if both are more powerful after Assad’s fall, the region remains multipolar, with other powerful states like Egypt, ��������Ƶ, the UAE, Qatar and, of course, Iran each deploying their own capacities to pursue their own agendas. On some issues, they may align with Israel or Turkiye, but on many they will not and would seek to challenge either if they ever attempt to dominate.

The nature of the region means that even were Turkiye or Israel to take Iran’s place as the most activist regional power, their time at the top may not last long. However, being aware of this, it is unlikely that either state will attempt hegemony and instead pursue more modest ambitions. Though Assad’s fall and Iran’s setback is a welcome boost, neither is likely to get carried away.

• Christopher Phillips is professor of international relations at Queen Mary University of London and author of “Battleground: Ten Conflicts that Explain the New Middle East.” X: @cjophillips