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The UK’s China policy swung dramatically during the 14 years of Conservative rule from 2010. While the new Labour administration is seeking to bring more stability to UK-China ties, this will be increasingly challenging given the growing lack of political consensus over Beijing.

This dissensus is being driven primarily by the opposition Conservatives. Encouraged by the stance of the incoming Trump administration, new Shadow Foreign Secretary Priti Patel has urged that Beijing should be designated as a UK national security threat. She particularly refers to the UK’s delayed Foreign Influence Registration Scheme, which is not expected to come into force for months to come.

During the Conservative governments from 2010 to 2024, the then-opposition Labour Party was never an unqualified supporter of government policy. Former Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, for instance, was frequently critical of what he saw as then-Prime Minister David Cameron’s relegation of human rights in bilateral relations.

However, there was rarely, if ever, the extensive, vociferous criticism of government policy that the Conservatives are now making about Labour in power. Patel last month called out “an extraordinary (Chinese) regime that for over a decade, quite frankly, has had all sorts of incursions in our country through national security, intellectual property, right down to cyber activity and misinformation.”

So, the UK political divide over China is growing, making it harder for the government to pursue a stable policy.

The UK political divide over China is growing, making it harder for the government to pursue a stable policy

Andrew Hammond

Patel’s attacks came as the government’s stance toward Beijing faced one of its highest-profile tests. Rachel Reeves has spent recent days in China, the first trip by any UK finance minister to the country since 2016. Joined by Bank of England Governor Andrew Bailey and UK business leaders, her key meetings included one with Vice Premier He Lifeng in Beijing on Saturday.

Reeves restarted the annual UK-China Economic and Financial Dialogue, which had been paused since before the COVID-19 pandemic. If those discussions show progress going forward, the two sides may also relaunch what had been a regular, wider meeting known as the Joint Economic and Trade Commission. UK firms have also pressed to restart meetings of the UK-China CEO Council, a group established by Theresa May and Li Keqiang in 2018.

Reeves’ talks covered issues such as clean energy, capital markets collaboration, interlinkage between financial markets and bond markets, and regulatory partnership. One specific topic of discussion was the Shanghai-London Stock Connect, which would enable dual listings and was first proposed in 2015 during the short-lived so-called golden era in UK-China relations under Cameron.

The UK government is not just wary of Conservative critics of its policy. In addition, the incoming Trump team is watching London’s positioning closely.

Already, Sen. Marco Rubio, Donald Trump’s pick for secretary of state, has issued a warning about the Starmer government’s deal to potentially give Mauritius control of the Chagos Islands. This is where a key US military base is located and some Trump supporters argue the UK deal would benefit Beijing.

The challenge of misalignment with the US on China policy was also something Conservative governments faced in the 2010s and 2020s. Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s government was, for instance, criticized by the first Trump administration after initially deciding to allow Huawei telecoms equipment in the UK’s 5G networks, albeit with a ban on supplying kit to the sensitive, core parts of this grid. However, the Trump team helped force a U-turn. This followed Washington placing additional US sanctions on Huawei to restrict the firm from using American technology and software to design its semiconductors.

The government is not just wary of domestic critics. The incoming Trump team is also watching its positioning closely

Andrew Hammond

Another example came during Cameron’s “golden age” with China, when the Obama administration raised concerns about the degree to which London was perceived to be cozying up to Beijing.

These episodes provide reasons for caution. However, the government has to balance this with its economic inheritance, including a post-Brexit need to diversify the UK’s economic ties.

This is a difficult tightrope to walk. It may be one reason why the government’s “audit” of UK-China relations has been delayed until after Reeves’ visit. It was due to have been published by now, within 100 days of Keir Starmer taking office.

Even before Brexit, many UK politicians across the political spectrum had generally perceived that enhancing ties with Beijing was in the country’s national interest. It was widely thought there was an opportunity to develop a relationship that could make a significant contribution to British prosperity for a generation to come and previous PMs like Johnson and Cameron had been instinctively supportive of engagement.

This is what makes formulating current UK policy so challenging. Under growing pressure, London faces a difficult balancing act, as it seeks to reconcile its future economic needs with significant concerns over China.

• Andrew Hammond is an Associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.