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Sultan Haitham bin Tariq visited Ankara on Thursday, the first visit by an Omani Sultan to Turkiye in nearly 40 years. The sultan’s visit was more than just a symbolic official one because it represented a shift in the dynamics in relations between Ankara and Muscat that have been steadily evolving over the past few years. The visit has garnered significant attention from the media and analysts.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan appeared to place great importance on the visit, personally welcoming him at Ankara airport with a rare level of protocol.
This year, the sultan became the third Arab leader, following the Kuwaiti emir and the Egyptian president, to receive such a reception from Erdogan. All three visits had symbolic significance and political weight.
During the sultan’s visit, 10 memorandums of understanding were signed, primarily focusing on enhancing trade and diplomatic ties. While defense cooperation was discussed during the press conference between Erdogan and Sultan Haitham, no agreement was reached in this area.
Of the six Gulf Cooperation Council states, Oman is the one where Turkey has yet to fully realize its potential in trade, politics, defense, and cultural relations. Although relations between the two states have never been tested by regional tensions, they have also not developed to the point of balancing a threat or pursuing interests at its maximum level.
To cement further progress, Turkish-Omani relations aim to move beyond the political and economic spheres and include greater focus on social and cultural exchanges
Sinem Cengiz
Due to Oman’s foreign policy line, relations with Turkiye remained coherent, unlike with other GCC states which saw its ups and downs. Also, economic and military cooperation has remained limited, while Turkiye fostered its military trade with each GCC state.
However, like other GCC states, Oman pursues a strategy of diversification in its economic and military policies, expanding its partnerships beyond its conventional allies and forging ties with several regional and global actors. Since the normalization in Turkiye-Gulf ties, Ankara has also been working to strengthen its cooperation with the GCC states, and Oman was the final piece in the puzzle that Turkey sought to complete in relation to the GCC states.
There are five main areas in which Ankara and Muscat agree to develop relations. First is that the two countries aim to increase their trade exchange to $5 billion, as they focus on untapped potential in sectors such as construction, tourism, and technology. Second, to cooperate in the energy sector. By 2025, Turkiye will begin receiving liquefied natural gas from Oman, with a new long-term agreement set to begin in 2025. Under the agreement, Oman LNG will supply 1.4 billion cubic meters of LNG annually to Turkiye for a period of 10 years. Third, the situation in Gaza, in particular, is an area where the two countries find common ground. Erdogan has emphasized Turkiye’s readiness to contribute to peace efforts in Gaza. Oman shares a similar position, consistently advocating for a peaceful resolution. This shared stance on regional peace underscores the potential for greater political collaboration between the two states. Fourth, Oman’s long-term development plan, Oman Vision 2040, presents an opportunity for Turkiye to play a more active role in Oman’s economic transformation. Turkish companies, which are not new to the Gulf, seek to benefit from increased participation in Oman's economic projects.
Lastly, to cement further progress, Turkish-Omani relations aim to move beyond the political and economic spheres and include greater focus on social and cultural exchanges. The two countries have long shared a deep cultural connection, which has been further strengthened by initiatives such as the opening of a Yunus Emre Institute branch in Muscat, aimed at fostering greater understanding between the peoples of Oman and Turkiye.
Education is another key area of collaboration. Sultan Haitham’s visit included discussions on academic cooperation, with a particular focus on creating opportunities for Omani students to study.
While military and defense cooperation has traditionally played a secondary role in Omani-Turkish relations, it has shown gradual growth in recent years.
The majority of the GCC states have shown interest in Turkiye’s defense industry, and some have already purchased Turkiye’s famous Bayraktar TB2 drones, and there is a growing potential for Oman also in the defense/military sphere. One of the more visible indications of this is the involvement of Turkish defense industry products in Oman’s military operations. For instance, Pars III 8x8 armored combat vehicles, manufactured by the Turkish defense company FNSS, played a central role in a joint military exercise conducted by the Omani Armed Forces.
This development came on the heels of a few military deals signed between Ankara and Muscat. This growing interest might signal a potential shift toward more formal military cooperation, even though for now, it remains relatively limited compared with other areas of partnership.
It is also significant here to note that among the GCC states, Oman and ¶¶Òõ¶ÌÊÓƵ are yet to join NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which was launched in 2004 in Turkiye. The UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar are already members. Under this initiative, two states can find further interests to cooperate on security-related issues while NATO is trying to boost its footstep in the Gulf region.
The Sultan’s Turkiye visit represents the beginning of a new chapter in Omani-Turkish relations. The visit indicates that Oman is adopting a step-by-step approach to its relationship with Turkiye — starting with boosting diplomacy, followed by closer trade and energy cooperation. This, in turn, could eventually pave the way for closer military and defense collaboration.
Turkish-Omani relations face no serious obstacles, yet there is still a lot of untapped potential in their partnership that could unfold over time.
- Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkiye’s relations with the Middle East. X: @SinemCngz