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For Benjamin Netanyahu, the killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar could have provided the ultimate victory photo-op. But victory is hardly the impression we are left with when looking at the Israeli leadership’s public statements and deeds, as they relentlessly continue the war in Gaza. This adds to suspicions that the Israeli prime minister is not interested in ending the conflict and bringing the hostages back, but instead is being guided by ulterior motives. In the absence of any prospect of a ceasefire, the worrying possibility is of a prolonged phase of terrible bloodshed — a lower-intensity war that could become the “new normal,” but still exact a heavy daily price from the people of Gaza.
Sinwar was number one on Israel’s hit list for his role in plotting the atrocities of Oct. 7, and regardless of any ceasefire deal, the Hamas leader, like everyone else, knew that the Israeli security forces would pursue him no matter how long it took. Few in Hamas understood Israel’s mindset as well as Sinwar, much of it learned during his more than 20 years in Israeli prisons — that it never lets up in its determination to exact revenge on those who cause it harm, whatever the scale of that harm. Yet, there was something extremely disturbing in the release of graphic images of his body showing the horrific injuries that he sustained. Fighting your enemy is one thing, and killing them on the battlefield is part and parcel of war; but for a civilized society, Sinwar’s death would mean that the score was settled, with no need for the gruesome photos and post-death humiliation. That can only be viewed as part of the brutalization of Israeli society.
By now Israel has eliminated most of the Hamas and Hezbollah leadership, but has this provided the elusive “total victory” it desires? The simple answer is no, and for the reason that not only has “total victory” never been defined in either military or political terms, but also because the way it has been presented could only denote a victory that will be delayed until the last militants of these movements are dead or have surrendered. If any country should know that this is not an achievable goal, it is Israel: from its experiences in Lebanon since 1982, its 77 years of oppressive occupation of Palestinian land and blockade of the West Bank and Gaza, and the extreme death and devastation it has inflicted on tens of thousands of Palestinians and now the Lebanese people, militants and civilians alike. None of this has enhanced Israel’s long-term security, its international reputation, or its national unity. Without a strategy or a political plan, and with its endless quest for further military targets, Israel has only been drawn into an escalating war on several fronts, and with no end in sight.
It would be superficial and inaccurate to argue that the cases of Hamas and Hezbollah and Israel’s approach to them are identical, but there are enough similarities to draw parallels, and none of these will instill any confidence that these conflicts are close to a conclusion. To begin with, the idea that eliminating the leadership of a dissident movement will mean its defeat has time and again proved to be spurious. One can strongly object to targeted assassinations for political and moral reasons in the first place, but when they do take place, the inevitable question is: to what aim? If it is about vengeance, which is hardly a human trait to be proud of, it results in no more than instant, often short-lived, gratification. If it is about deterrence and leaving the organization without leadership and thereby interrupting its operations, that has proved to be a temporary solution. A new leadership always emerges, one that is not necessarily more conducive to, or understanding of, Israeli interests.
The Israeli prime minister is not interested in ending the conflict and bringing the hostages back.
Yossi Mekelberg
If there was any sense of disappointment at the killing of Sinwar, it was that he was not killed in a well-planned operation but as a result of a chance encounter with Israeli soldiers. Hence, it caught the Israeli leadership unprepared; but instead of moving quickly into the political-diplomatic sphere, hubris and euphoria have descended on the Israeli government and its prime minister, with the belief that Israel can continue fighting on multiple fronts and force a resolution, instead of negotiating one.
Unless Israel can change gear and move to a phase that prioritizes a ceasefire, the release of the hostages, and the reconstruction of Gaza while ensuring that it is governed by Palestinians, with a transition period supported by the regional and international elements, we can expect only a prolonged and dangerous occupation of the enclave, at least its northern part, and along with that, mounting pressure from within the coalition, including the Cabinet, demanding the resettlement of Gaza — a proposal that should be nipped in the bud. There is also the thorny question of when your enemy’s entire leadership is wiped out, who do you negotiate with? This might also be a headache for the mediators, but not an insurmountable one.
The Chinese strategist Sun Tzu understood many hundreds of years ago the need to “build your opponent a golden bridge to retreat across” — to create an environment for your enemy to accept that you hold the upper hand, but without humiliating them, and leaving room for peace beyond the war. There are two separate, but related, reasons why Israel has not subscribed to this sound advice and lacks an endgame. First is the surprising and shocking nature of the incident that sparked this war, which meant that ever since the Israeli government has only been operating on a tactical and not a strategic level.
Equally concerning is that it is led by a prime minister whose survival in power, and ability to derail and deflect from his corruption trial has obliged him to surround himself with extremists and incompetent politicians who either do not understand the gravity of a prolonged multi-front war with no political solution in sight, or, in their distorted view of the current conflict, see a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to end this conflict by annexing the West Bank and Gaza, and expanding its territory in the north, possibly all the way to the Litani River in Lebanon.
Tragically, this extremist dream is a nightmare for anyone else involved, including the regional powers and a large part of the international community. Hence, there is a collective responsibility to prevent this scenario from becoming reality before it is too late.
• Yossi Mekelberg is a professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House.
X: @YMekelberg