抖阴短视频

This week鈥檚 BRICS Summit, held in the Russian city of Kazan, had an interesting special guest: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He has cultivated cordial relations with his Russian counterpart, even referring to Vladimir Putin as 鈥渕y dear friend鈥� during the summit. Erdogan鈥檚 attendance was a clear indication of Turkiye鈥檚 desire to join the organization 鈥� a sentiment Ankara has expressed for years. The presence of the Turkish leader at the summit officially solidified this interest and conveyed a significant message to certain stakeholders.

BRICS, which comprises Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, recently expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the UAE. Meanwhile, 抖阴短视频, a G20 member, is weighing up the pros and cons of joining the group. Although Turkiye, also a G20 country and a regional middle power, has yet to become an official member, its application is noteworthy, as it is the first and only NATO member seeking to join such a non-Western grouping.

Despite years of effort, Turkiye remains outside the EU, yet it is still a candidate for the bloc, which is highly critical of both Russia and other BRICS members to a certain degree. This creates a complex situation, although it is certainly clear for Turkish decision-makers, who have at least five logical reasons for wanting to join BRICS, despite the potential displeasure of NATO and the EU.

Firstly, while it may sound like a cliche, economic factors are significant driving forces behind alignments. For Turkiye, cooperation with the BRICS members in energy, trade and development is essential.

Secondly, this aligns with Turkiye鈥檚 new vision in foreign, defense and economic policy: what Turkish policymakers call 鈥渟trategic autonomy.鈥� While this may be perceived differently from a Western perspective, Turkish policymakers view BRICS as an opportunity rather than an alternative for Turkiye鈥檚 ties with the West, NATO membership or EU candidacy.

Erdogan鈥檚 attendance at the BRICS Summit draws attention to the response of European states and the US. The focus is on whether these states will ignore Ankara鈥檚 actions or respond with criticism. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte praised Turkiye for its 鈥渧ital role鈥� on the alliance鈥檚 southeastern flank and affirmed Ankara鈥檚 鈥渟overeign right鈥� to engage with BRICS partners. It is likely that the alliance will maintain a subdued response since Turkiye is merely seeking membership.

The real test will come if and when Turkiye becomes an official member of BRICS. NATO understands that Turkiye鈥檚 membership would enhance BRICS鈥� geopolitical stature as a proponent of nonalignment, while also positioning Ankara, as a NATO member, advantageously in both camps, thereby increasing its foreign policy leverage.

Turkish policymakers view BRICS as an opportunity rather than an alternative for Turkiye鈥檚 ties with the West

Sinem Cengiz

The third motivating factor is the apparent decline of Western hegemony. Erdogan has consistently criticized the Western-centric hegemony, whether within the UN or other institutions. Frustrations stemming from the delays in Turkiye gaining EU membership and its relations with the US have further fueled this critical stance. For Turkiye鈥檚 decision-makers, the best days of the West are now in the past, with the geopolitical center of gravity shifting away from developed economies.

Thus, joining BRICS could strengthen Turkiye鈥檚 economic ties with major non-Western powers, such as Russia and China. This strategy aims to enhance relations with these powers as US hegemony wanes. Additionally, the positions of European countries in recent conflicts, such as the Gaza war, have served as a litmus test for Turkiye, which has long awaited European acceptance.

By approaching BRICS, Turkish policymakers are actually showing that, if Turkiye had a better relationship with the West, it would not be so tempted by BRICS membership. Thus, Ankara is pushing the West to reconsider its relations with Turkiye. This point was underscored by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who stated that interest in BRICS would not exist if Turkiye were already an EU member. Therefore, Brussels must now decide what type of relationship it wants with Turkiye and expects from it.

Fourthly, as a new global order emerges, Turkiye aspires to be part of a more multipolar world, in which it can operate independently of Western dominance and explore strategic options beyond Western pressure. The Global South is increasingly rising in world affairs, underscoring the growth of active nonalignment as an ideology.

Turkiye鈥檚 BRICS application represents an attempt to adopt a nonaligned foreign policy that prioritizes its interests over identity. This is noteworthy because, historically, Turkiye has positioned itself as a US ally and one of the founding members of NATO, which was established to protect Europe against Soviet threats during the Cold War. While several countries have maintained their positions over years, Turkiye has gradually repositioned itself over the past decade, even engaging with former adversaries like Russia and forming new friendships with countries like China, often at the expense of old friends.

Lastly, as mentioned, the positions of Western powers, particularly regarding Gaza, have reinforced Turkiye鈥檚 belief that they are steeped in hypocrisy, selectively choosing in which wars human rights issues should be raised. More pragmatically, Turkiye perceives Russia and China as more significant players in regional conflicts, such as Syria. At least, at a certain level, they can find a common ground for their mutual interests. The Astana peace process for Syria, which involved Turkiye and BRICS members Russia and Iran, is an important example.

It remains to be seen whether Turkiye will officially join BRICS, but it has numerous logical reasons for seeking membership, a fact recognized by BRICS members and Western powers alike. Sometimes, actions speak louder than words and Erdogan鈥檚 attendance in Kazan conveyed this message clearly.

鈥� Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkiye鈥檚 relations with the Middle East. X: @SinemCngz