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The Arakan Army has emerged as a formidable force in Myanmar, with its commander-in-chief Maj. Gen. Twan Mrat Naing playing a pivotal role in transforming the group’s position both militarily and politically. The Arakan Army now controls 11 of Rakhine State’s 18 townships and, with this newfound power, it has shown openness to the possibility of repatriating the Rohingya. This presents a critical opportunity for Bangladesh to rethink its approach to resolving one of the most intractable crises in the region: the safe return of nearly 1 million Rohingya refugees currently residing in Bangladesh.

Historically, Bangladesh has relied on diplomacy with Myanmar’s civilian government under Aung San Suu Kyi and, after the 2021 military coup, the ruling junta, to negotiate the repatriation of the Rohingya. This strategy has, however, yielded no tangible results. Both Suu Kyi and the Tatmadaw — the military — were complicit in creating the environment that led to the mass exodus of the Rohingya in 2017. Expecting either party to negotiate in good faith without significant international pressure has been a flawed assumption, which has only prolonged the suffering of the Rohingya people and strained Bangladesh’s resources.

Given the Arakan Army’s growing influence and its relatively progressive stance on the Rohingya issue, Dhaka must consider building a positive relationship with it and the national unity government, Myanmar’s shadow government formed after the coup. This would involve recognizing their authority, offering diplomatic support on international platforms like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and working collaboratively to develop a repatriation plan before any potential collapse of the current military government in Myanmar. Though risky, this approach may offer the best hope for a sustainable solution to the crisis.

Bangladesh’s previous approach to the Rohingya crisis was grounded in pragmatism: maintain a working relationship with whoever was in power in Myanmar, whether it be Suu Kyi’s civilian government or the junta that took over in 2021. Dhaka’s goal was to avoid confrontation and work quietly behind the scenes to encourage repatriation.

Dhaka must consider building a positive relationship with the Arakan Army and the national unity government

Dr. Azeem Ibrahim

One of the most glaring errors in this approach was its decision not to join Gambia’s case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice in The Hague. This case, which accuses Myanmar of committing genocide against the Rohingya, could have been a powerful lever to increase pressure on the Myanmar government. However, fearing a diplomatic backlash, Bangladesh opted to maintain a more cautious stance, which ultimately did nothing to move the needle on repatriation.

The Arakan Army’s growing control over Rakhine State, home to many of the Rohingya’s ancestral villages, positions it as a key player in any future repatriation efforts. Unlike the Tatmadaw, which has a vested interest in maintaining ethnic divisions for its own political gain, the Arakan Army is more focused on establishing its authority in the region and building political legitimacy. What makes the group unique is its relative openness to the possibility of Rohingya repatriation, as indicated by statements from Naing. This marks a stark departure from the stance of the Myanmar military, which has consistently denied the Rohingya’s right to return. For the Arakan Army, successful repatriation of the Rohingya could bolster its standing both domestically and internationally.

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Moreover, the United League of Arakan, its political wing, has demonstrated a willingness to engage with the international community and address human rights concerns. This presents an opportunity for Bangladesh to engage with a more credible partner in negotiations. By building a relationship with the Arakan Army and the national unity government, Dhaka could help pave the way for a repatriation plan that prioritizes the safety, rights and dignity of the Rohingya people.

Of course, shifting Bangladesh’s policy toward the Arakan Army and the national unity government would not be without its risks. The former, despite its military prowess, remains a rebel group and its long-term intentions regarding the Rohingya are still uncertain. Additionally, the junta could view any overt support for either group as a hostile act, potentially escalating tensions between Bangladesh and Myanmar. There is also the risk that the international community, particularly ASEAN, may be slow to recognize the Arakan Army and national unity government as legitimate political actors, making diplomatic progress more difficult.

Continuing to work with a regime that has consistently shown bad faith will only prolong the suffering of the Rohingya

Dr. Azeem Ibrahim

However, the potential rewards of this strategy far outweigh the risks. Continuing to work with a military regime that has consistently shown bad faith will only prolong the suffering of the Rohingya. By contrast, engaging with the Arakan Army and the national unity government could lead to a more sustainable and just solution, one that allows the Rohingya to return to their homes with guarantees of safety and citizenship.

The current approach to Rohingya repatriation has failed. Bangladesh must pivot to a more dynamic strategy that recognizes the changing power dynamics in Myanmar and the emergence of new actors. By building a positive relationship with these groups, Dhaka can position itself as a regional leader in finding a solution to the Rohingya crisis.

This will require a careful balancing act: offering diplomatic recognition and support to the Arakan Army and national unity government while continuing to engage with international organizations and regional powers like ASEAN. But with no other viable options on the table, this longer and riskier path may be the only way to bring the Rohingya crisis to a just and lasting resolution.

• Dr. Azeem Ibrahim is the director of special initiatives at the Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy in Washington, DC. X: @AzeemIbrahim