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For much of the postwar era, Germany and France have been the twin motors of European integration. Yet, as the continent faces one of its potentially most challenging periods, there are possible crises brewing in both nations.
To be sure, it is not uncommon for there to be big political problems in one or the other of these two traditional pillars of the EU. However, what makes September 2024 much more unusual is there have been significant crises in the eurozone’s two largest economies at the same time.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is still reeling from regional election results in East Germany earlier this month that saw the Alternative for Deutschland gaining the most votes in Thuringia, the first time since the Nazi era that any far-right party has won in this way in any state. The AfD secured over 32 percent of the vote, almost 10 percentage points ahead of the second-placed Christian Democratic Union.
The results are disturbing, but the AfD is unlikely to win power nationally at the next national election, even though it is a growing political force. However, the unpopular three-party coalition headed by Scholz’s Social Democratic Party, which includes the Greens and the liberal Free Democratic Party, may not survive in power until the scheduled federal ballot in September 2025.
While it remains possible that Scholz could win power again, albeit potentially with a different coalition, a long-running political crisis continues to fester in France following the success of the far-right National Rally in June’s European Parliament ballot when it won the most votes in that country. This conundrum is potentially worse than in Germany, as there is a serious possibility that National Rally leader Marine Le Pen could become France’s next president in 2027.
Immediately after the landmark European Parliament result, French President Emmanuel Macron called snap elections in late June and early July for the General Assembly that saw a stalemate, with no one party winning close to an overall majority. France still had a caretaker prime minister until the Sept. 5 appointment of technocrat Michel Barnier, who led the EU’s Brexit negotiations with the UK. It remains to be seen if he can form a strong, sustainable government.
The political weakness of Scholz and Macron is made worse by their poor political relationship. It is noteworthy that since the end of Angela Merkel’s long chancellorship, Macron has sought to balance French ties with Germany with those of other key nations.

It remains unclear if Macron and Scholz can enhance their domestic political positions.

Andrew Hammond

Most recently, for instance, he signed the Barcelona Treaty with Spain, stepping up cooperation on trade and energy. This includes building a massive underwater pipeline to carry hydrogen and other renewable gases between Barcelona and Marseille.
Moreover, in 2021, Macron signed the Quirinale Treaty with Italy. Under that pact, France and Italy committed to greater coordination in areas such as migration and AI.
This highlights that, while the Franco-German alliance has been the traditional motor of European integration, cooperation between the two powers ebbs and flows, depending in part on the personalities of the office holders in Berlin and Paris. Under Scholz and Macron, bilateral relations have generally been far from fruitful, despite the galvanizing impact of the Ukraine war.
This matters not just for bilateral relations, but also the future of the EU. It is now just over six decades since the landmark 1963 Elysee Treaty between France and Germany established a new foundation for relations following centuries of rivalry.
The European Economic Community at the time had six founding members: France, West Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The EEC’s initial aim was to bring about economic integration among its member states.
Six decades later, in a transformed European landscape, the Franco-German alliance remains important. In this context, and with big potential challenges approaching, including a possible second US presidency for Donald Trump, it remains unclear if Macron and Scholz can enhance their domestic political positions, and patch up their poor personal relationship.
It should be remembered that Merkel and Macron, despite not seeing eye-to-eye on every issue, were quite often successful in shaping the future of Europe and its wider role in the world. Key achievements that they were central to include when they persuaded fellow EU members to agree to give the bloc, for the first time in its history, debt-raising powers.
This was to finance a €750 billion ($831 billion) post-coronavirus recovery plan, potentially paving the way for greater supranational powers of taxation and a more federalized continent. It represented a potentially major milestone in the post-war history of European integration with the solidarity it shows between larger and smaller economies, and the generally more affluent north and less prosperous south.
So, a stronger Macron-Scholz relationship could still help steer the EU toward a pathway of deepening cooperation in coming years. Yet, there is a significant risk, instead, of different futures, as neither leader may have the answers or the political capital to address the growing challenges ahead.
It should be remembered that Trump, in his first term, called for countries beyond the UK to leave the Brussels-based club. At best, the EU may only be able to muddle through from where it is today.
This is why the brewing crises in Berlin and Paris matter. With potentially limited time left in office, Macron and Scholz know the remainder of their terms could still have outsized impact in defining the bloc in the late 2020s, but they may be unable to seize the opportunity.

• Andrew Hammond is an Associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.