Boeing 737 MAX test pilot grappled with simulator flaws, too

Pilots have complained they did not know about the existence of MCAS for the Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft before the Lion Air crash in October 2018. (AP)
  • Broader conversation appears to show the Boeing pilot was also grappling with a number of software problems with the flight simulator Btself
  • Pilots have complained they did not know about the existence of MCAS before the Lion Air crash in October 2018

SEATTLE: In newly released instant messages from 2016, a top Boeing 737 MAX test pilot tells a colleague that the jet鈥檚 MCAS flight control system 鈥� the same one linked to two fatal crashes 鈥� was 鈥渞unning rampant in the (simulator) on me.鈥�
But the broader conversation appears to show the Boeing pilot was also grappling with a number of software problems with the flight simulator itself, according to a former Boeing test pilot who analyzed the transcript and who had direct knowledge of the flight simulator at the time.
Such calibration problems may have contributed in some way to then-chief technical pilot Mark Forkner鈥檚 observations and conclusions about MCAS鈥� behavior, the former pilot, and a second former Boeing engineering employee, Rick Ludtke, said.
The messages, first reported by Reuters, appear to be the first publicly known observations that MCAS behaved erratically during testing before the aircraft entered service.
They sent Boeing鈥檚 shares tumbling, prompted a demand by US regulators for an immediate explanation, and a new call in Congress for the world鈥檚 largest planemaker to shake up its management.
At one point during the 9-minute conversation, Forkner tells colleague Patrik Gustavsson that he was in his hotel room 鈥渨ith an ice-cold grey goose鈥� after a session on a flight simulator earlier in the day.
The Nov. 16, 2016 conversation took place four months before the US Federal Aviation Administration certified the MAX, the latest iteration of Boeing鈥檚 737 aircraft, and two years before deadly crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia killed 346 people.
That simulator, likely supplied by Textron Inc. company TRU Simulation + Training, was also still months away from winning FAA certification and had numerous technical problems that affected its performance, the former Boeing pilot said.
At one point in the exchange, Forkner tells his colleague the machine was 鈥減retty stable鈥� and he had signed off on some 鈥淒Rs,鈥� or 鈥渄iscrepancy reports鈥� 鈥� likely meaning that they had resolved earlier issues, the two former Boeing employees said.
鈥淏ut there are still some real fundamental issues that they claim they鈥檙e aware of,鈥� Forkner said, likely referring to the manufacturer.
Boeing declined to comment. TRU did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Forkner鈥檚 lawyer David Gerger told Reuters: 鈥淭he simulator was not reading right and had to be fixed to fly like the real plane.鈥�
Earlier in their conversation, Gustavsson asks Forkner whether he could get anything done in the simulator or if he experienced the 鈥渘ormal chaos.鈥� That likely refers to general software issues, the former Boeing employees said.
Forkner then says MCAS was 鈥渞unning rampant in the sim on me.鈥� He describes what he experienced: 鈥淚鈥檓 levelling off at like 4000 ft, 230 knots and the plane is trimming itself like craxy (sic). I鈥檓 like, WHAT?鈥�
Gustavsson responds that he experienced similar patterns with MCAS, 鈥渂ut on approach.鈥�
鈥淥n approach鈥� is when pilots line up the aircraft to land. At a certain elevation, pilots typically extend the aircraft鈥檚 flaps, the former Boeing employees said.
Boeing has said MCAS only operates when the flaps are retracted, so it would be unusual that Gustavsson would have experienced the same behavior on approach, with flaps extended, the former Boeing employees said.
鈥淲e don鈥檛 know if he is describing glitches in the simulation, or if it鈥檚 actually an MCAS misbehavior,鈥� Ludtke said.
Pilots have complained they did not know about the existence of MCAS before the Lion Air crash in October 2018. In a separate set of emails released by the FAA on Friday, Forkner told the agency in January 2017 that the company would delete references to MCAS from the flight operator鈥檚 manual 鈥渂ecause it is outside the normal operating envelope.鈥�
In marketing the 737 MAX, Boeing said current 737 pilots would only need computer-based training on the new narrowbody model rather than simulator training, which is more costly. The FAA approved the training requirements when it certified the aircraft in 2017.